President Donald Trump addressed the media in Hanoi on February 28, soon after the collapse of his much publicised summit with the North Korean leader Kim Jong un. He put up a brave front but looked clearly disappointed and dispirited. This was also evident from his initial focus on US-Vietnam relations, the India-Pakistan situation and on Venezuela before coming to the issue for which he had travelled all the way from Washington DC. Of course, the media had no interest in these issues at all.
Trumphas no one but himself to blame for his unrealistic expectations of the NorthKorean leader. Certainly, most knowledgeable observers had cautioned him thatKim Jong un would not be willing to move ahead rapidly towardsdenuclearisation. Certainly, no one expects that he will agree to surrender allhis stock of nuclear warheads and missiles. Why was Trump then so hopeful?
AUS president has a wealth of excellent advice, both official and non-official,on any issue that comes before him. He has to nevertheless refract it throughthe prism of his own knowledge, experience and predilections. Trump’s career inreal estate and property development seems to have convinced him that financialgain and reward are the main motivating factors in human affairs. He hastransposed these in the strategic arena. Hence, his constant emphasis on NorthKorea’s potential for economic growth and transformation when Kim’s priority ison maintaining a nuclear shield against possible regime change. He has theexample of Libya’s Muamar Gaddafi before him.
Anotherindication of Trump’s thinking emerged after this summit. Kim and he had agreedat their first summit in Singapore in June last year that the US-South Koreamilitary exercises would not take place for the North Koreans considered themas a provocation. At the same time Kim had agreed to abandon nuclear andmissile testing. This was an obvious strategic trade-off. Despite the lack ofsuccess at Hanoi both countries have stuck by that bargain. Many US strategiststhough feel that exercises with South Korea should continue.
Trumphas not defended this decision on strategic considerations but for financialreasons. In a tweet on March 5 he wrote, “The reason why I don’t want militarydrills with South Korea is to save hundreds of millions of dollars for the US.That was my position long before I became President. Also, reducing tensionswith North Korea at this time is a good thing.” Separately, he complained thatthe exercises are important for South Korean security but it does not reimbursethe US for them. No other important leader has publicly ever projected suchfinancial considerations as the cause of strategic decision making.
Itis noteworthy that the dismantling of North Korea’s nuclear facilities anddestruction of its stockpiles is the strategic objective of the US and itsallies. What Trump is trying to do is offer economic and financial inducementsto Kim Jong un to give up what for him are obvious strategic assets. That isone policy pillar. The other is to inflict economic pain through sanctions.This is nothing but a high scale variant of a “carrots and sticks” policy. WhatKim is seeking is to offer some of his strategic facilities but not hisstockpiles for the removal of all sanctions. He does not seem to be interestedin Trump’s grand vision of economic progress. This was evident from what Trumpand Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and the North Korean foreign ministerrevealed after the summit’s failure.
Kimwas willing to dismantle his country’s principal nuclear facility at Yangbyonand in return asked that all sanctions be lifted. This facility was constructedin the 1980s and has yielded nuclear materials for bomb making. It was closedand re-opened in the past as the cat and mouse game between North Korea and theUS and its allies has gone on for twenty-five years. Trump has been critical ofhis predecessors for not taking decisive action to end the North Korean nuclearprogramme. After the Hanoi summit he emphasised that he could have agreed on theKim offer but it would have not been good for the US. Hence, he was willing tobe patient.
Trump’scritics in the US have naturally attacked him for the summit’s failure. Theyhave alleged insufficient diplomatic preparation and unilateral concessions haveeroded pressure on North Korea. More fundamentally they have questioned if thefocus should be on North Korea not undertaking nuclear and missile tests or ongiving up manufacturing them and giving up its stockpiles. They are thus reallyasking Trump if all his drama his record on North Korea is any better as yetthan that of his predecessors.
Whilethe sanctions remain Kim has made substantial diplomatic gains since theSingapore summit. He has become more internationally respectable. The rhetoricagainst him has tapered off, at least for the time being. Trump does not holdhim personally responsible for the ill treatment of the US student OttoWarmbier who was released by North Korea in a coma after more than a year’simprisonment; he died six days later.
Where does the North Korean nuclear issue go from here? The Trump administration will no doubt persevere for some time in trying to persuade North Korea to be willing to dismantle some more nuclear facilities. This may work but the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula remains a distant dream. Amateur if enthusiastic diplomacy seldom yields results.
Vivek Katju
vivekdkatju@gmail.com